recognised the present complex as a revival of the old. Sometimes the experiment failed; and it speaks for the reliability of the observers that they did not hesitate to report failures. Sometimes specific differences were realised between the second and the first experiences. Complete success, under the limitations of the method, was usual with D, G and J; less frequent with F.1 (i) The method of examination furnishes two kinds of report: the 'selective', in which the observer gives special attention to certain features of his experience, and the 'complete', in which he seeks to reproduce the experience as a whole. Since we were unable to say beforehand what was relevant and what irrelevant to our problems, we asked only for the complete account.
By putting questions to the observer, it is often possible to gain information as to matters omitted from the report; and, what is more important, the bringing of the observer's attention to these omissions leads to their avoidance in future. Owing to the danger of undesirable suggestion, very great care is needed in framing the questions; and a careful record of question and answer must always be kept. Our object in the work of ?? 2 and 4 was to drop them entirely, as soon as the reports became spontaneously complete. During the stage of training, however, the observers were frequently requested by the experimenter to supplement a process-report by naming the meaning, or conversely to supplement a meaning-report by an analysis of processes. After some practice, the recourse to parentheses became familiar: though it should be added that no observer was wholly consistent in their use, or entirely regular in paralleling process and meaning. (2) We cannot insist too strongly upon the necessity of repeated instruction; the task set is so difficult that even the most reliable and most willing observers tend to omissions. A meaning may be stated, while the corresponding process is in whole or part omitted: thus, an observer reports "general notion of a discussion in that book about the psychology of genetics," and a question is needed to bring out the fact that the 'general notion' was carried in kinaesthetic and verbal terms. Or a process may be described, while the corresponding meaning is in whole or part omitted: thus, an observer reports "sensations of slight strain in chest, as breath was held for a moment; sinking in abdomen; other sensations of touch from clothes; other organic sensations not so clear in consciousness," without giving any indication of the meaning of the attitude. There is often failure, even after practice, to report the time of an occurrence, to state fully the object of perception, to give the stages in the development of a meaning, to rehearse the conscious processes present. The observer must therefore be keyed up to his task by insistent repetition of the instruction.
(3) We do not here enter upon the question-which indeed is a question rather for epistemology than for psychology-how it is possible to give two parallel accounts, in terms of process and in terms of meaning, of 1This method of repetition was introduced in order that we might determine whether the method of examination satisfied Wundt's requirement of "Wiederholung bei gleichem beobachteten Inhalt" (Psych. Studien, iii., I907, 332 f.). The results are encouraging; though we offer them only as a first contribution to the settlement of the question.
It is perhaps needless to add that recognition is not conditioned upon possibility of description; we often recognise, quite definitely, something that we are entirely unable to describe. one and the same total experience. The possibility has been taken for granted by previous investigators (Biihler, Diirr, von Aster), and we simply follow in their footsteps. It should, however, be said expressly that the shift of attitude, from process to meaning or conversely, presentedafter preliminary training-no insuperable difficulty to the observer. If a process or a meaning stood alone in the report, the failure was due to inadvertence. All the observers found that duplicate accounts were possible, that processes could be summed up in a meaning, and that meanings could be paralleled by processes. We may add that the word 'process' was chosen, not as the equivalent by definition of sensations, images and feelings, but in order to leave room for any other conscious form (e. g., an imageless thought) that might be discovered.
(4) We append a full report on the experience of understanding a sentence. The observer was instructed to open his eyes upon signal, to look at the paper, to get the meaning of the sentence written upon it, and then to close his eyes and dictate his report. The notes which follow the quotation call attention to the details of the method.
Observer F. Stimulus sentence: She came in secretly. Time: I.25 sec. "Purple (from written words)1 clear. White (from paper)' and black (from cardboard)' in background, and these were [comparatively]2 unclear. Simultaneous with the visual clearness, kinaesthetic-auditory images (corresponding to the words); weak intensity, more as if whispered than as if said in ordinary voice; i. e., lacked deeper tones; and slightly faster than I should ordinarily say them. (The words did not come singly, but the sentence as a whole made a single impression on me; e. g., the period at the end was a part of the total impression. 7Completion of understanding; meaning of sentence has been specialised. 8The contents of the fore-period were here not under analysis.
? 2. THEZ PERCEPTION OF LETTERS
Our problem, in this group of experiments, was to determine what precisely occurs in consciousness when there is 'perception' of a single letter. The method has been described.
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The stimulus was a letter written in long-hand; the time of exposure was left to the decision of the observer, the instruction being that he should close his eyes as soon as he had experienced as much as he could report with accuracy and completeness. Usually, the time of observation was i to 3 sec.
The processes involved in perception.-For the most part, the visual sensations aroused by the stimulus are not sufficient, of themselves, to constitute a perception of the particular letter; some additional process or processes must supervene. Since the office of these additional processes is to designate the object of perception, we shall call them, in brief, 'designatory processes'. They generally consist of kinaesthetic or auditory sensations or images as of pronouncing or hearing the letter, or of a combination of the two. The following Observer D. Stimulus Y.-.. Then sensations in throat (of repeated contraction and relaxation) accompanied by faint auditory images (of the sound). In the course of this, the perception (of Y) faded away, and attention during this time was on the kinaesthetic sensations and on the idea (that I must not utter the word).
Then (was aware that eyes, which had not been carefully fixating, were now doing it). Strain sensations in muscles around sides of eyes.
Then sensations (of eye-movement) and awareness (that I was following the Y around; and while doing this it was not Yfor me but just a line gure).
Observer F. Stimulus Z.-When first opened eyes, the black white and grayish sensations became clear (the stimuli being the paper, ink, letter and black background). The extent of the visual field was [0 indicates a rough circular outline on the table]. This state was of short duration. (All this was perception of [some] letter on white paper on black ground.)
Later came the auditory image Z and with it the perception (of Z). [All that was at first perceived, as the observer specified on question, was letter in general.]
(2) In order to test the above result, the observer was sometimes instructed (oftenest in the case of J) to wait till a time arrived when there were present in consciousness no kinsesthetic or auditory images or sensations as of uttering or hearing the letter, and to begin the report from that time. Two instances may be given. 'In two cases from J, in which the kinaesthetic-auditory image as of utterance of the letter was probably or certainly lacking, the D. P. were given in the form of images of incipient right-hand movements, as for the writing of the letter. These cases are not included in the Table. On the other hand, the Table contains 7 'repetition' experiments, 4 from F and 3 from J: cf. (5) below. Observer G. Letter G.-Strong strain sensations (from fixation of thickest part of the letter), with great clearness of blue localised to the upper right half, and with special clearness of its extent and form. Much less clear were the other blues of certain extent and form interrupted here and there by white (as if the letter was incomplete, or as if there were breaks in the line.) These other blues were blurred in outline and indefinite in shape and direction They were simply there, (without seeming to belong together,-which is now carried into this previous experience); [ The observer means that the incoherence was present in the original experience, but that he was not aware of it as such; he now notices it, as he frames his report.] (this I call blank empty staring at the stimulus); accompanied intermittently by temperature and pressure and auditory sensations (of expiration) alternately with warm and pressure sensations (of tip of tongue against upper teeth) and by vague white somewhere surrounding the blues. These blues were constant. This whole experience is not a perception (When the letter C was perceived, the visual fixation was not as just described), and there was no verbal image 'apple'. At times during the perception (of C there was incipient motor innervation of the index finger of the right hand to follow the curve of C; at times also to continue the movement in the form of an A); and simultaneous with this was a visual image with very faint, hazy and shadowy outlines. I do not remember whether verbal images were or were not present simultaneously with the perception (of the letter).
(4) Sometimes the observer fails to report the presence of D. P., and a question is needed to bring them to light. Thus in one case the observer reports 'attention attracted to the horizontal line,' and only in reply to question by the experimenter is it added that there were simultaneous kinaesthetic sensations from eye-movement,-though these obviously played the part of D. P. in the perception. 1 We have said that, if the D. P. are absent, there is 'usually' no perception of the letter. The rule has possible exceptions. Especially during the earlier observations, J was often in doubt whether there was a perception of the letter at times when the contents of consciousness were predominantly visual. Thus, with stimulus G, he reports "a period during which the visual sensations alone were prominent, witl simultaneous pain and pressure sensations about eyelids and probably in other muscles of eyes. During this period there was no well-defined well-developed perception of G; at most there was a hazy and ill-defined perception; but I cannot say with surety whether there was this or none at all." (5) The Table mentions These designatory processes may characterise other perceptions, as well as the perception of a letter. From knowledge of the stimulus, the experimenter cannot determine the nature of the perception at a given instant; a report of the precise object of perception must be obtained from the observer.
Variation of the object of perception, with a given stimulus, is accompanied-again, under the conditions of our experiments-by variation of the concomitant or underlying 'processes'; this variation may usually be traced both in the designatory processes and in the processes which subserve accommodation of attention.
? 3. THE MEANING OF WORDS
The experiments now to be reported were the first made in the present investigation; the method was tentative, and the observers were comparatively unpractised for the problem in hand. The usual method of procedure was as follows: A written word was laid before the observer for a period of i min. He was instructed to fixate the word, to utter it with quick repetition, and to get its meaning. The concluding 10 sec. were marked off by signals; and the observer's task was to report what occurred in consciousness during this particular interval.
Our aim in adopting this method was to secure frequent appearances and disappearances of the verbal meaning, and so to provide repeated opportunities for its analysis. The method was fairly successful, though the period of io sec. proved to be too long for a complete report; the experimenter was therefore obliged in many cases to have recourse to questions-made as little suggestive as possible-in order to secure omitted information and, less frequently, in order to verify the absence of an unreported item.
The special form of the method which involved repetition has been described above, p. 555. Another variation was sometimes introduced, by which a feature of the original report was eliminated, and the consequence of this elimination noted. Thus, with the word silently G reports the presence of kinaesthetic-verbal images 'still' and 'silently means ruhig'; these images carry the meaning of the stimulus-word. He is thereupon in-structed to fixate the word and to articulate, as before, but not to permit the rise of such verbal associations. The report of the changed situation reads: 'No meaning to the word. Just sounds and just sensations from articulation. ' The repetition and prolonged fixation of the stimulus-word had the effect, as we expected, of intermittently destroying associations. But they led also, in some cases, to the disintegration of the perception itself. Special parts of the word might stand out and be perceived in place of the whole. Thus, a kinaesthetic or auditory or combined image of one of the letters arises, accompanied by visual fixation of that letter, and perhaps leaving the rest of the word visually (peripherally) obscure: then there is perception of the single letter rather than of the whole word, despite the fact that the word is being uttered. Our records suggest, though they do not prove, that so long as there are visual sensations from the whole of the word, with simultaneous enunciation of it, the perception remains. [In order to give opportunity for the analysis of this imaginal bodily attitude two repetitions (p. 555) were made. Both were successful; in the first repetition the attitude was declared more distinct than in the original experience. The reports, supplemented by questions, brought out the fact that the attitude was wholly kinaesthetic; the observer was crouching, and concealing an object in front of her with body and hands; she was aware of people behind her, who, however, were not given in visual images The meaning of the stimulus-words were thus carried by visual, auditory and kinaesthetic processes; or, to speak more precisely, the meanings which these processes bore were the meanings of the stimulus-words, in so far as the latter were consciously realised. If we may use the term 'association' in the widest sense, to denote peripheral-kinaesthetic as well as imaginal processes, we may say that the meanings were given in the shape of associations to the words. But the associations to a given word do not remain constant: thus, the visual image of plants and a hot-house, associated to the word botany, gives way a moment later to the verbal-motor 'study of plants'. It seems to follow that the meanings of the words, so far as they are conscious, vary as the associations vary. We did not find a characteristic variation of associations with the different parts of speech.
Those which stood for the meanings of prepositions, e. g., were not invariably motor tensions or impulses. ' On the whole, kinesthesis was more prominent with prepositions than with nouns like 'piano' and 'dog'; but visual and auditory processes were also involved in the meanings.
Here are instances of various kinds: What, now, is the difference between these two kinds of associates,-those that carry the meaning of the stimulusword and those that do not? The question may be answered from two points of view. If we regard the associates as 'processes', in the sense of ? 2, then we must reply that the meaning-associates proceed from the instruction given, while the not-meaning-associates are external to the instruction; the former indicate the activity of a particular determining tendency, the latter indicate the activity of reproductive tendencies not connected with this determination. If, on the other hand, we regard the associates as themselves 'meanings', again in the sense of ? 2, then we must reply that the associates which carry the meaning of the stimulus-word are, as independent part-meanings, logically relevant to the total word-meaning, while the associates which do not carry the meaning of the word are as independent part-meanings 1Thus, we found nothing that could warrant such a generalisation as Rowland makes in the case of adverbs: op. cit., 27 ff. logically irrelevant to the total word-meaning. Both of these replies, however, require qualifying comment. First, the observer is not (at least, in our experiments was not) aware of any introspective difference between the processes associated under the instruction, and the external associates,-between the processes which carried the word-meaning and the processes which were outside of that meaning. There is no modal or qualitative difference; there is no special 'feel' of 'belonging' to the instruction, or to the situation induced by it'; simply, the observer is able, on question, to point to certain associated processes as carrying the meaning of the word and to certain other processes as not involved in the word-meaning. Secondly, the independent part-meanings borne by the associates are not necessarily their obvious or face-meanings; the test of logical relevancy or irrelevancy cannot, any more than the test of procession from the instruction, be applied by the experimenter on behalf of the observer; some ingrained habit of the observer in regard to reproductive tendency, or the disposition into which he is brought by the present situation, may give all manner of warps and twists to the part-meanings carried by the associates as such; constituent processes, which appeal to the experimenter as vehicles of a definite part-meaning, may prove to be extrinsic to meaning, may (in popular phrase) be 'ignored' by the observer; and constituent processes which appeal to the experimenter as casual may turn out to be, for the part-meaning, essential. In every case, then, we are forced back upon the distinctions drawn by the observer; there is no criterion, whether psychological or logical, which can be applied by the experimenter in default of the observer's specific statement.
If we seek to analyse the instance given above (Observer G, Stimulus cunning), we reach the following general result. First, to take the associates as processes: we have the utterance of cunning arousing, by mechanical sound-association outside of the instruction, the familiar name Cunningham (the name of a friend and colleague); and we have then the added member -ham (the observer himself notes the 'addition' of this member) arousing, still outside of the instruction, the image of a ham. Thereupon the observer harks back to his instruction: and his return is effected, typically, in verbal imagery. 'What is cunning?' he asks, in internal speech, and the verbal image wise appears, issuing from the instruction 'Get the meaning.' The processes Cunningham and ham do not aid in carrying the meaning of the stimulus-word; the process wise does so aid.
Secondly, to take the associates as meanings: Cunningham and ham have their own independent meanings, irrelevant to the meaning of the stimulus-word cunning; they form separate constellations, outside of the 'It should be said that the observers were not specially questioned upon this point. As the reports stand, however, there is no indication of any 'feeling' of direction or of guidance or of any regional consciousness. The instruction itself was carried in the usual and typical ways; we do not think it necessary to give illustrations. instruction. Wise, on the contrary, has a fringe of meaning of its own, which is logically relevant to the meaning of cunning.
We have chosen this instance for analysis, because it is unusually simple; because in it the experimenter can, to some extent, put himself in the observer's place, and see the 'reason' for the admission of some associates to the rank of vehicles of word-meaning, and for the rejection of others. But the simplicity of the instance is quite unusual; and, for that matter, we have no doubt that our analysis, undertaken after the event and on general psychological principles only, is far from complete.
Although the observer was able, without hesitation, to make the distinction between meaning-associates and associates that had no share in the meaning of the stimulus-word, the relation of the meaning-associates to the word-perception was never reported as a specific and characteristic conscious reference.
Special questions were therefore asked, in order to determine whether such a specific reference came to consciousness.
Observer [Instruction was given to repeat.] The images came as before, but more vaguely. . .. I found a certain conscious spatial relationship, namely, the visual image appeared close to the word seen; but I was not able to ascertain whether there were other conscious relationships.
We are thus led to the conclusion, indicated in a previous paragraph, that the conscious 'meanings' brought out in these experiments are not the perfect and static logical meanings of definition, but rather partial meanings, particular exemplifications, or what not, touched off under the given instruction by the habit or the momentary disposition of the observer. Logically, the representation of meaning is inadequate; psy-chologically, it is adequate to the demands of the occasion. We may add that, especially at the beginning of the work, the observers often showed a tendency to verbalise a definition of the stimulus-word, and thus to meet the situation with logical as well as with psychological adequacy.' ? 4. THE UNDERSTANDING OE SENTENCES In this part of our study, the stimuli were simple sentences, type-written. These were laid before the observer, who was instructed to open his eyes upon a signal; to read and understand the sentence before him; and then to close his eyes and recount his experience.
We shall outline the results from each one of the observers. This report is typical, in so far that D always records the automatic reading before she gets the meaning of the sentence. It is typical of about one-half of her reports, in that it shows her doubt whether she shall identify the associated ideas, aroused by the stimulus, with its meaning. It is apparent 'Since the experiments here reported were concluded, the writer has found that, if he reads any particular word upon a printed sheet (looks at the word, and gets a kinasthetic-auditory repetition of it), there is usually attached to it a thin coat of meaning which distinguishes it from other words similarly read, though there is a total absence of recognisable associations. Save for two or three possible instances, whose interpretation is not clear, such direct or incorporated meaning did not appear in the experiments of this Section. On the general question, see Titchener, Thought-processes, 1909 Then a visual image, vague and schematic (of a girl who was sometimes myself and sometimes Miss X walking on tiptoe into my Office). At the same time organic and kinaesthetic sensations (as if I were going through that performance), namely, respiratory sensations (from repressed breathing), general kinaesthesis (from slight tremor of whole body), articulatory sensations, kinaesthetic sensations (from walking on tiptoe), and contact sensations in arms and hand (from touching sides of doorway as I entered). All this organic and kinaesthetic complex was the clearest thing in consciousness. There were quick alternations of pleasant and unpleasant feelings accompanied by kinaesthesis which I can't analyse now, though it was definite at the time.
Then feeling (of assurance) in terms of respiratory sensations (from rather deep and free breathing), and a certain kinaesthetic complex (from eye-movement, meaning that this attitude of walking in secretly conveyed the meaning of the sentence.)
Next we give a sample of G's reports. It will be seen that there is a very full description of processes. The reader is requested to attempt, as he goes through the report, definitely to decide at what point, if at all, the meaning of the sentence was realised. In yet other cases the meaning comes simultaneously with the perception of the words, and is carried by non-verbal images or sensations. We may therefore say that (save for one instance, which resembles the three peculiar reports of F to be discussed below) the reports of G are like those of D; the perception of the words, that is, visual sensations accom-57I panied by designatory processes, does not necessarily involve awareness of the meaning of the sentence, which either (I) comes in terms of non-verbal images or sensations, appearing simultaneously or later, or (2) does not come at all.
The reports of F show two types: in the one, perception of the words or of the sentence precedes the meaning, which finally appears in terms of non-verbal images or sensations; in the other, these meaning-associates occur simultaneously with the perception. There are, however, three reports which stand by themselves. We give two of them, in part: If we may assume that F has not overlooked something, we have the result (confirmed by a single case from G) that the visual and auditory images and sensations from reading might be the sole processes present in consciousness, while yet the sentence had meaning.1
We turn now from 'processes' to 'meanings'. And we note that it is not enough for the observer to make the bare statement that he did, or did not, understand the sentence. For oftentimes, at the moment of understanding, the sentence has a special or peculiar meaning. There are a few cases in which the associates of the single word recur (usually with some alteration of form) in the cluster of associates aroused by the sentence. Thus, in both experiments a proper name calls up, for one observer, a visual image of the same person; 'process' and 'meaning' are identical in the two reports. In another instance, the word face has the same reported meaning under both conditions, though the 'process' appears in the one experiment as a visual image, in the other as a kinaesthetic complex.
In the great majority of cases, however, the associations traceable to the word in context are not those previously aroused by it in isolation. This result harmonises with the statement made on p. 564 regarding the variable character of meaningful associations. The word-in-sentence is not a separate stimulus, but merely a constituent of a total stimulus, which is the sentence; as constituent of the total stimulus it may, of course, set up determining tendencies in the sense of its own meaning; but this meaning is now only a phase of the total meaning of the sentence, a meaning of incorporation or of implication; and it is therefore impossible to predict, from the report on the single word, how the meaning of the word-in-sentence shall appear in consciousness. G reports, with the stimulus heavily, 'Meaning was mostly kinaesthetic, and secondarily organic.' With the stimulus-sentence The iron cube fell heavily on the floor, this mode of meaning has lapsed; the effect of the word heavily shows only in the 'faint auditory image (meaning a very loud sound'). We may refer also to the reports of D on secretly and She came in secretly (pp. 563, 570), which illustrate the same point. The difference was especially marked in the case of prepositions: taken alone, these words tended to form a context of their own, verbal or attitudinal (by gesture); occurring in a sentence, they simply colored the meaning of the total stimulus.-Cf. the remarks of H. M. Clarke, this Journal, xxii., 1 I, 236 ff.
Summary. i. The meaning of a sentence is often entirely lacking at the first reading, i. e. the initial perception of it, and appears later, borne by processes representative of its content or of some response to that content made by the observer.
2. Sometimes these representative processes come with the initial perception, and the sentence at once has meaning; sometimes they seem to be absent, while the meaning nevertheless arises.
3. The same stimulus-sentence may give rise to different meanings for the same observer, so that it is not enough for him to say that he understood it; he must be asked to specify precisely what he understood.
JOURNAL-7 ? 5. IN REPLY TO CRITICISM.
The discussion of Imageless Thought has led, time and again, to personal exchanges of regrettable warmth. Yet the issue is, after all, an issue of fact; it is the observations that count, and not the thrusts of controversy. When, for instance, Dr. Watt suggests that an observation made in the Wiirzburg laboratory is eo ipso more dependable than an observation taken in the Cornell laboratory ;1 when, forgetting the genesis of his own Theory of Thinking, he belittles the work of graduate students ;2 when Professor Ogden charges that Okabe's analyses of Belief "would apply equally well to a description of the aesthetic attitude, the ethical attitude, the consciousness of understanding, or indeed any other of the higher apperceptive states of mind;"3 when he remarks that Clarke's conscious attitudes are "unblushingly" analysed into sensory and imaginal components;4 when he declares that the method of confrontation is "quite a perfunctory affair" and leads to an "equivocal result;"5 when he cleverly dubs the sensationalistic school 'the opposition', and thus puts the champions of imageless contents into the secure position of governmental orthodoxy:6-in all these, and in many similar instances, the polemics simply mean "I refuse to accept your results." Or perhaps, since the phrases are polemical, they may carry the further meaning, "although I can't explain them away;" for emotion is likely to appear when argument has broken down. Let these things pass, then, and let us come to close quarters with Professor Ogden's criticism. This is, in a nutshell, that Cornell observers have been predisposed against "the discovery of meanings in experience", and have therefore confined their introspections to the "known mental categories of sensation, image and feeling in which [they] have been schooled." The best reply to the first of these statements is the fact of the present paper. Professor Ogden's critique appeared on June 15, i9II; and, by that date, the experiments by our 'method of parentheses' had been concluded. It is true that previous Cornell experimenters have intentionally neglected meanings, in the sense of this term used in the present paper. But, so far from having a predisposition against meanings, we have in the present work made a systematic attempt to cultivate reports about them. And we reach a result which does not 'Mind, xx., 191I, 403. 2Ibid., 403 f. 3Psychol. Bulletin, viii., I9II, 194. 4Ibid. SIbid. 6Ibid., i86 f. accord with Professor Ogden's views: we find that wherever there is meaning there are also processes, and we find that the correlated meanings and processes are two renderings, from different points of view, of one and the same experience.
We have already stated that it is frequently no easy matter to give a detailed account both of attributes of process and of shades of meaning. the beginner who is set for the report of meanings will be likely to overlook the corresponding processes, and conversely, just as, if he is set for the report of the quality of a sensation, he will be likely to overlook the correlated sensory intensity, and conversely. To be sure, after considerable practice it becomes tolerably easy to report the principal features of the double task, but even then omissions sometimes occur.
But it must be remembered that the danger of defect is two-sided; it inheres in either mode of predisposition. When Professor Ogden writes: "It is precisely in the brief moments of active thinking that the thoughtfactor is most apparent" (op. cit., 187), he lays himself open to the very objection that he is urging against his opponents. If by the thoughtfactor is meant the meaning, the topic or object of thought, that must, in the very nature of things, be most apparent under the conditions of quick active thinking; and, again in the nature of things, the corresponding processes must, under such circumstances, be least apparent; the observer is set for meaning,-and even if the instruction is changed, and he is later set for the reporting of processes, the brevity of the experience will work against him. But there is absolutely nothing in the case to compel our belief that meaning without process exhausts the experience, that process is altogether absent.
A like reply might be made to the complaint of Professor Ogden's colleague (op. cit., I93).
If the relatively untrained observers gave plentiful meanings in their original reports, and failed to specify processes, that is because they had not been taught to distinguish between process and meaning and to report on the former as well as on the latter. If the trained observers of the later work gave nothing but sensations and images and feelings, that is because they had been taught to observe processes, and the experimenter did not demand of them the statement of meanings. Our experience shows conclusively that observers who have had a long training in process-report are able, after training, to parallel the processes by meanings.
And the same reply, once more, invalidates Professor Ogden's discovery of imageless thought in the quoted report of our observer F (op. cit., I95). "Red: blue :: green : yellow. I started to say this automatically. Then I repeated the stimulus and said 'intermediate' verbally. Some kind of consciousness that meant 'principal colors.' I did not say 'principal'." Rewritten in terms of our method of parentheses, the last sentences would be: "Some kind of consciousness (that meant principal colors.) I did not say principal". F found a meaning present, the meaning of principal colors; and he found also a corresponding process, about which, however, he could say nothing more than that it was not a kinaesthetic-auditory verbal image.
As to the second member of Professor Ogden's criticism, that Cornell observers have confined their reports to the description of sensations, images, feelings, and like familiar modes, and have failed to find a new process (if we use this term again in our present sense),-we must admit the fact. But Professor Ogden has, nevertheless, confused the deed of this non-discovery with the will. The observers did not, it is true, ON MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING 577 to Kilpe, while lecturing on Leibniz, "that the monads were not 'concepts' but thoughts;" here, still according to Professor Ogden, is Kiilpe's first idea "regarding the character of thought as a distinct mental element."1 But was not Kiilpe, then,-to borrow a word of Professor Ogden's-predisposed to the discovery of the thought-element?
We greatly regret that we have been unable to compare our results, in detail, with those of former workers in the same field. Limits of space forbid; as they forbid, also, a further exploitation, at this time, of our observers' reports.
